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Ghosts of the Disciplinary Machine: Lee
Harvey Oswald, Life-History, and the
Truth of Crime
Jonathan Simon*
It seems to me important, very important, to the record that
we face the fact that this man was not only human but a rather
ordinary one in many respects, and who appeared ordinary.
If we think that this was a man such as we might never meet,
a great aberration from the normal, someone who would stand
out in a crowd as unusual, then we don't know this man, we have
no means of recognizing such a person again in advance of a
crime such as he committed.
The important thing, I feel, and the only protection we have
is to realize how human he was though he added to it this sudden
and great violence beyond-
Ruth Paine'
I. INTRODUCTION: EARL WARREN'S HAUNTED HOUSE
Thirty-four years ago, the President's Commission on the Assas-
sination of President Kennedy, popularly known as the Warren
Commission, published its famous report. The Commission's most
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1. WARREN COMMISSION, THE WITNESSES: SELECTED AND EDITED FROM THE WARREN
COMMISSION'S HEARINGS 266 (1964) [hereinafter WARREN COMMISSION, WITNESSES]. Ruth
Paine was a liberal Quaker who belonged to the American Civil Liberties Union and took part
in civil rights and related causes. Marina Oswald, Lee Harvey Oswald's wife, was living with
Paine in a Dallas suburb at the time of the assassination. According to the Warren Commission's
findings, Oswald spent the night before the assassination at Paine's house, where he recovered
a rifle he had stored in a garage-the rifle with which he shot the President. Paine was
interrupted by a question from former CIA Director Allen Dulles.
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famous conclusion, that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, shot and
killed President John F. Kennedy,' has been the subject of ceaseless
public debate.3 Such attention, of course, is understandable. The
theory of a "lone gunman" seems too mundane an explanation for the
closest crime a republic can have to regicide.4 The overwhelming
popular interest in the Commission's judgment, however, has had the
unfortunate consequence of deflecting analysis away from the
Commission itself as a political and cultural event. It has prevented
reflection on the meaning of the Commission as an artifact of legal
history.5 In this Article, I begin a larger project that explores the
2. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
475-76 (1964) [hereinafter WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT]. Members of the Commission
included Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; Allen Dulles, former Director of the
CIA; Richard Russell, Democratic Senator from Georgia; John Cooper, Republican Senator
from Kentucky; Hale Boggs, Democratic Representative from Louisiana; Gerald Ford,
Republican Representative from Michigan; and John McCloy, a senior diplomat.
3. The Warren Report has generated one of the most energetic debates in modem American
political history. Many have accused the Commission of credulousness if not conspiracy. Some
of the best known critics include: EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, INQUEST. THE WARREN COMMISSION
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUTH (1966); JIM GARRISON, ON THE TRAIL OF ASSASSINS
(1988); MARK LANE, RUSH TO JUDGMENT (1966); PETER DALE SCOTr, DEEP POLITICS AND
THE DEATH OF J.F.K. (1993); and ANTHONY SUMMERS, CONSPIRACY (1981). The latter served
as a source for Oliver Stone's movie JFK (Warner Bros. 1992). Conspiracy discussion is also
active on the World Wide Web. See, e.g., The Kennedy Assassination Home Page (visited Dec.
19, 1997) <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/home.htm>; Les Duffy's JFK Assassination Information
Site (visited Dec. 19, 1997) <http://www.geocites.com/CapitolHi/2857/>; 60 Greatest Conspiracies
of All Time (visited Dec. 19, 1997) <http://www.conspire.com/jfkfront.html>. For a recent book
defending the Warren Commission, see GERALD POSNER, CASE CLOSED: LEE HARVEY
OSWALD AND THE ASSASSINATION OF J.F.K. (1993).
4. I use the metaphor of "regicide" advisedly. Michel Foucault characterizes regicide as the
paradigmatic crime of monarchical society, in which all crimes are to some extent attacks on the
body of the sovereign. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 47 (Allan Sheridan trans., Pantheon 1977) (1975). Killing a president is as close to
regicide as it is possible to come in a republican political order. The symbolic suggestions of
regicide in the Kennedy assassination were further heightened by the nature of Kennedy's
massive head wound. Kings were symbolically represented as the "head" of the "body
politic"-thus the significance of beheading as an act of revolutionary justice. See MICHAEL
WALZER, REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION AT THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI 23-25 (1974). A president
dying in office is traumatic, a murdered president even more so, but here the President's brain
tissues were blown into the faces of individual witnesses and described to millions of others.
Chief Justice Warren apparently was so troubled by the autopsy photos of JFK's head that he
could not sleep at night for the thought of them. He told Norman Redlich that he feared the
editors of Life would print them on the cover of the magazine. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
SUPER CHIEF. EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT 498 (1983). The decision to withhold
the photos turned out to be a weighty choice because their absence has fueled speculation that
the Warren Commission engaged in a cover-up ever since. See id. Warren, a master of modem
government, may have appreciated just how unsettling such a spectacle could be. There was
something premodern in the physicality with which this sovereign figure had been dispatched.
No doubt adding to this corporeality was Oswald's lynching by Jack Ruby while millions
watched on live television.
5. For an early exception, see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 3. More recently, scholars have
begun to explore the Kennedy assassination and its aftermath in a more complete cultural
context. For a sophisticated effort to understand the role of the media in producing the social
meaning of the Kennedy assassination, see BARBIE ZELIZER, COVERING THE BODY: THE
KENNEDY ASSASSINATION, THE MEDIA, AND THE SHAPING OF COLLECrIVE MEMORY (1992).
See also SCOTT, supra note 3.
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significance of the Kennedy assassination by reflecting on a narrow
but pivotal part of the Commission's work: the life-history of Lee
Harvey Oswald that comprises the majority of chapter seven of the
Warren Report.6 I am particularly interested in the ways in which the
Report's psychological biography of Oswald-assembled primarily by
three young members of the Commission's staff--opens a unique
window into the history of what Michel Foucault calls "disciplinary
power."7 I am also interested in exploring the ways in which an
examination of the Warren Report's biography of Oswald can suggest
aspects of criminological truth missed by Foucault.
My interest in the Commission's life-history of Oswald is far from
accidental. The centrality of life-history in the Kennedy assassination
was brilliantly explored by the novelist Don DeLillo in Libra, his
account of Oswald and the assassination.' In Libra, life-history
incorporates both knowledge of the self and the unknowable synergies
between events and choices.9 Oswald's biography is the conceptual
centerpiece of the Warren Report, the symbolic axis on which it turns.
For the Warren Commission was charged not only with discovering
the truth about the assassination, with discovering its meaning, but
also with persuading the American people of that truth. The Commis-
sion had to do more than simply trace the bullets that killed President
Kennedy to a gun in Lee Harvey Oswald's hands: It had to fill the
empty space of that trajectory with a believable explanation; it had to
make sense of what happened. And as the Commission began to edge
toward its celebrated thesis that Oswald alone was responsible for the
death of the President, it became clear that its Report would have to
anchor the truth of the crime inside Lee Harvey Oswald himself."
The more the Commission rejected a conspiratorial interpretation of
Oswald's act, the more it became necessary for it to present the truth
6. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 375-429 ("Lee Harvey Oswald:
Background and Possible Motives").
7. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 138-41. This biography was published as an appendix to the
Report. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 669-740 ("Appendix XIII:
Biography of Lee Harvey Oswald"). Chapter seven drew on this for its narrative of Oswald's
life and motivations.
8. DON DELILLO, LIBRA (1988).
9. "Think of two parallel lines," wrote DeLillo. "One is the life of Lee H. Oswald. One is
a conspiracy to kill the President. What bridges the space between them? What makes a
connection inevitable? There is a third line. It comes out of dreams, visions, intuitions, prayers,
out of the deepest levels of the self. It's not generated by cause and effect like the other two
lines. It's a line that cuts across causality, cuts across time. It has no history that we can
recognize or understand. But it forces a connection. It puts a man on the path of his destiny."
Id. at 339.
10. The Warren Commission investigators, for instance, considered the possibility that a
variety of organizations might have worked with or inspired Oswald, including the Soviet Union,
Cuba, domestic left-wing groups, organized crime, and right-wing groups in Dallas and New
Orleans. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 243-74.
1998]
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of the assassination and the truth of Lee Harvey Oswald's personality
as one. In approaching this task, the Commission required a portrait
of Oswald's life that would convincingly explain his behavior. It
required a psychobiographical foundation to interpret a criminal-
political event."
The Warren Commission was hardly unique in anchoring the
meaning of a crime in the life-history of its perpetrator. The Commis-
sion, rather, was traversing well-worn grooves laid down by more than
two centuries of writing by prison reformers, social workers,
criminologists, and psychiatrists. Beginning in the early nineteenth
century, legal and scientific experts vigorously promoted the idea that
the truth of crime lay in the criminal, and they sought to collect
detailed information about petty deviants in order to track and
control their behavior.12 The institutional sources on which the
Warren Commission drew to assemble Oswald's life-history-what I
call the Commission's "ghosts"-reflect this practice of assembling
clinical information about deviant individuals, revealing the presence
of a broad enterprise of investigating criminal personalities in the mid-
twentieth century. As I will explain, for instance, the Warren
Commission learned about Oswald's childhood and family circumstan-
ces (details of which were critical to its analysis of the assassination)
because at age thirteen, Oswald became a subject of New York's
juvenile court, one of the first encounters he had with a variety of
such "disciplinary institutions" throughout his brief life. In this
respect, the clinical knowledge characteristic of modern efforts to
explain and combat crime, as well as the organizations that collected
and analyzed such knowledge, form the background against which
chapter seven's biographical truth unfolds.
In Part II, I offer a brief overview of the penological tradition that
formed the foundation of the disciplinary institutions on which the
11. This task was made even more acute by the need, of which all of the members of the
Commission may or may not have been aware, to avoid exposure of the intelligence operations
surrounding the assassination that became public knowledge more than a decade later, including
the participation of members of organized crime in covert acts of national security. See generally
SCOTT, supra note 3.
12. The literature on the history of such efforts and related developments in penology is
extensive. See, e.g., THOMAS DuMM, DEMOCRACY AND DISCIPLINE: DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF
THE UNITED STATES (1987); FOUCAULT, supra note 4; MICHEL FOUCAULT, I, PIER.RE RrvERE,
HAVING SLAUGHTERED MY MOTHER, MY SISTER AND MY BROTHER ... : A CASE OF
PARRICIDE IN THE 19TH CENTURY (Frank Jellinek trans., University of Neb. Press 1975) (1973);
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES (1984);
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1750-1850 (1978); DARIO MELOSSI & MASSIMO PAVARINI, THE PRISON AND THE
FACTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM (1978); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971);
JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE
UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990 (1993).
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Warren Commission drew to assemble Oswald's biography. This
tradition dominated American criminal law until the decade following
the Kennedy assassination, and it is critical to understand its history,
particularly what is known as its Progressive period, to understand the
Report itself. This history has been examined most incisively by
Michel Foucault, and this section of my Article thus in part
constitutes a discussion of his work. I am especially concerned with
explaining how Foucault understood the relation between penology
and sociopolitical organization as a whole.
In Part III, I describe the specific disciplinary sources from which
the Commission constructed its life-history of Oswald, particularly
juvenile courts and the military. My aim here is not to re-present
Oswald's life in any comprehensive sense (that task was undertaken
by the Commission), but rather to map the particular wellsprings of
knowledge about Oswald found in the Report and to reveal their
institutional deposits of power.13 This "genealogical" analysis is
different from a "hermeneutics of suspicion," which exposes official
discourse as a hollow sham. 4 Instead, following Foucault, I do not
believe criminological explanations are discredited merely because
they operate against a discursive and institutional background. My
goal is simply to understand what disciplinary sources made possible
the particular type of criminological truth present in the Warren
Report.
In Part IV, I examine the role that Oswald's mother, Marguerite,
played in the Commission's interpretation of her son's criminal
behavior. Marguerite's own life-history, particularly her bitter conflict
with dominant gender norms of the period, became central to how the
Commission understood Lee Oswald's personality. Her testimony
before the Commission-which combined spectacular but unsupported
claims about the role of the CIA in killing the President with the
13. Oswald's life-history has been retold several times since the Warren Commission. Recent
efforts include NORMAN MAILER, OSWALD'S TALE: AN AMERICAN MYSTERY (1995); and
POSNER, supra note 3. I borrow the phrase "deposits of power" from Stanley Cohen, who used
it to describe the epistemological by-products of institutional practices: "These deposits take the
form of descriptions (stories) and causal theories, which are drawn upon and leave behind real
forms of power." STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL WORK 84 (1985).
14. The phrase is Paul Ricoeur's. See PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY
ON INTERPRETATION 32 (1970); see also Linda Fisher, Hermeneutics of Suspicion and
Postmodern Paranoia: Psychologies of Interpretation, 16 PHIL. & LITERATURE 106, 114 n.4
(1992); Geoffrey H. Hartman, Tasking the American University: 1990s, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
105 (1994); Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed
Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REv. 523,
584-96 (1988). On Foucauldian genealogical method, see generally MITCHELL DEAN, CRITICAL
AND EFFECTIVE HISTORIES: FOUCAULT'S METHODS AND HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY (1994);
HUBERT DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT. BEYOND HERMENEUTICS AND
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sincere promise to produce documents to prove that her son was a
model child-should be read as an impassioned struggle against the
forces of disciplinary knowledge that interpreted her son's life and as
a critique of the Warren Report's epistemological strategies and their
institutional supports. Beneath Marguerite's often disturbing tes-
timony is a woman groping toward an unarticulated understanding of
the nature of criminological truth. I wish to retrieve her voice. At this
point in my analysis, propelled by Marguerite's testimony, I begin to
reexamine the meaning of Oswald's act as intricately intertwined with
the very disciplinary institutions that ultimately helped explain it. My
goal is to read the construction of chapter seven's truth in reverse by
understanding more clearly the cultural and political conditions that
supported Oswald's act and the Commission's work. In this respect,
I argue, the meaning of the Kennedy assassination may indeed lie in
Lee Harvey Oswald's life-history, though in a very different way than
is currently understood.
II. DISCIPLINARY POWER AND THE TRUTH OF CRIME
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Michel Foucault
characterizes the emergence of modem penology as a fundamental
reconfiguration of political authority in general." Before the creation
of modem penal practice, writes Foucault, most serious crimes were
punished with either death or some less severe form of physical harm
or disfigurement, including whippings, split cheeks, brands, and
cropped ears. These "rituals of the scaffold" were designed to
manifest the awesome and glorious figure of the sovereign. 6
Criminals were understood as traitors against the king's peace, and
the king responded to their crimes by reasserting his power through
their public physical dismemberment or mutilation. Such physical
harm was designed to serve as a kind of morality tale in which the
king's subjects witnessed the gruesome consequence of crime in the
necessary triumph of law. The response, that is, operated from the
criminal's body out to the audience-its real object. According to
Foucault, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
this dominant response to crime began to change. Whereas public
spectacle and physical pain followed a judgment against serious
offenders in an earlier period, in the modem era the psychological
methods associated with prison reform became the characteristic
response to criminality. 7 While prisons involved physical custody,
15. See FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 222.
16. Id. at 53.
17. Foucault may have exaggerated the swiftness of the shift from spectacular to disciplinary
punishments, but the direction of the shift and its relationship to political power remains
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they did not target the body as an object of pain nor create public
spectacles of retribution. Instead, prisons worked to instill obedience
and social utility in their inmates by encouraging them to internalize
methods of self-scrutiny and control. No longer merely an enemy of
the king's peace, the criminal in this historical period came to
represent deviation from a social norm to be corrected and restored
if possible, and eliminated by life sentences or execution if not. The
goal of the prison was to restore this norm by rehabilitating offenders
through a meticulous categorization and coordination of their
behavior using mechanisms of external and internal surveillance."
According to Foucault, this change in penal practice represented a
transformation not simply of the penal sphere; instead, it reflected a
more fundamental transformation of the operation of social and
political power in society. The rituals of the scaffold played a critical
role in promoting a system of authority based on the super-power of
the sovereign and his associated local rulers. In the new "disciplinary
society" that emerged contemporaneous with the birth of the prison,
the state maintained its official concept of sovereignty, but its capacity
to rule increasingly was based on the deployment of disciplinary
techniques at the microlevel of society. In place of the scaffold and
tools of physical mutilation, the sovereign relied on paper forms and
files for archiving information, spaces designed to optimize surveil-
lance by marking off individuals and disciplinary agents capable of
analyzing the details of the self and correcting deviations. This
approach was designed to produce a "docile" population whose social
utility could be more easily measured and behavior more efficiently
directed."9 It was this new relation of power and knowledge, accor-
ding to Foucault, that permitted the rise of democratic polities with
their ideological celebration of the individual and its liberties. Liberal
persuasive. See PIETER SPIERENBURG, THE PRISON EXPERIENCE: DISCIPLINARY INSTITUTIONS
AND THEIR INMATES IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1991).
18. In recent work, Malcolm Feeley and I have explored the end of this form of penology,
even as an aspiration, and have examined the emergence of new penological practices and
strategies. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice:
Power/Knowledge in Contemporary Criminal Law, in THE FUTURE OF CRIMINOLOGY 173
(David Nelkin ed., 1994) (examining new practices in criminal law that exemplify risk
management orientation); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on
the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992) (arguing
that penal enterprise has abandoned traditional concerns with transforming individuals to
address community concerns and instead seeks to manage a permanent criminal underclass for
ends more related to internal managerial efficiency than socially defined objectives like
rehabilitation or punishment); Jonathan Simon & Malcolm M. Feeley, True Crime: The New
Penology and Public Discourse on Crime, in PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF SHELDON MESSINGER 147 (Thomas G. Blomberg & Stanley Cohen eds., 1995)
(arguing that the new penology is dominant among penal professionals but has little influence
on public discourse about crime).
19. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 168.
1998]
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political theory, that is, with its talk of social contracts, rights and
national constitutions, implicitly was based on an archipelago of lowly
disciplinary institutions such as prisons, factories, and schools that
made formally free individuals governable. Emerging institutions of
democratic self-governance relied on the simultaneous construction of
organizations capable of disciplining the self through a detailed
knowledge of the individual. Banal mechanisms of surveillance drawn
from penal practice represented a fundamental component of the
great political transformation that made the individual citizen
sovereign.
This new disciplinary political regime developed over time and
revealed as much change as continuity in its history? The two most
important periods in its transformation fell at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, with the rise of the modern prison, and at the
beginning of the twentieth, with the invention of penal social work.
This second phase, the period most important for my purposes, is
known as the Progressive era of penology. It gave birth to the secular,
scientific form of penal practice, in contrast to the quasi-religious
understanding of "penitentiary" reform that prevailed for much of the
nineteenth century. This scientific form of penology saw the introduc-
tion of individualization as the absolute aspiration of penal practice.21
Each of the major Progressive era penal innovations, particularly the
indeterminate sentence, parole, and probation, mandated that justice
be based on the specific etiology of the offender's criminality. The
innovations presupposed the capacity of the era's institutions to
produce criminological truth. Because the possible sources of
criminality recognized by the Progressives were multiplex (they
included genetically inherited mental traits, cultural maladjustment,
and psychopathologies of all types), it was critical in Progressive
penology to understand the truth of a particular offender in complete
detail. In this era, therefore, while scientific data of all kinds was
highly valued in penal practice, a special premium was placed on
collecting a rich narrative history of the offender's life, preferably
narrated by the offender himself as well as by his family members and
others in a position to observe his circumstances.' Collecting life-
histories thus emerged as a crucial element of disciplinary power in
20. For a discussion of periodization in the history of penology and a case for the dis-
tinctiveness of Progressive penology, see generally David J. Rothman, Sentencing Reform in
Historical Perspective, 29 CRIME & DELINo. 637 (1983).
21. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND
ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980) (discussing penal innovations like parole,
probation, and the juvenile court in light of the individualized model of justice).
22. For a close analysis of fife-history in the practice and theory of American social science,
see JAMES BENNETT, ORAL HISTORY AND DELINQUENCY: THE RHETORIC OF CRIMINOLOGY
(1981).
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the scientific era, providing a critical link between detailed knowledge
of individuals and the governance of the institutional spaces they in-
habited.
Perhaps no institution better characterizes the Progressive era of
scientific penology than the juvenile court, which was formed during
the early part of the twentieth century as a response to a perceived
increase in the number of young offenders.' The juvenile court
combined a thoroughgoing commitment to rehabilitation over
retribution with an identification with the fields of medicine and social
work. Deriving its legal authority from the doctrine of parens patriae,
meaning literally that the king was the "father of the nation," the
court linked the power of the sovereign state to act as a parent to a
capillary system of knowledge collection that relied on a coterie of
disciplinary caseworkers dutifully assembling and categorizing
delinquent behavior. In short, the juvenile court brought to an
apotheosis the revolutionary transformation of power begun with the
birth of the prison a century before. It represented the most profound
inversion of the role biographical narrative had played in the
sociopolitical order of earlier periods. "For a long time ordinary
individuality-the everyday individuality of everybody-remained
below the threshold of description," noted Foucault.
To be looked at, observed, described in detail, followed from day
to day by an uninterrupted writing was a privilege. The chronicle
of a man, the account of his life, his historiography, written as he
lived out his life formed part of the rituals of his power. The
disciplinary methods reversed this relation, lowered the threshold
of describable individuality and made this description a means of
control and a method of domination.'
The juvenile court, a legal institution specifically for young, powerless
individuals, brought this inversion into its very center. It was a
thoroughly modern instrument of Progressive governance. It was also
one that would leave its mark on Lee Harvey Oswald and the Warren
Commission, a subject to which I will turn in a moment.
Before discussing the Warren Commission's use of life-history, it is
worth noting the full theoretical implications that lay beneath
Foucault's analysis of criminological biography. For underlying the
notion of life-history in Foucault's work is a kind of paradox. Foucault
argued that the rise of disciplinary power suggested that criminal
behavior could be primarily explained not through a juridical notion
23. For further analysis, see Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a
Postmodern Society, 16 CARDozO L REV. 1363, 1384-92 (1995).
24. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 191 (emphasis added).
1998]
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of individual responsibility, but through a new notion of causality with
medical, educational, and administrative implications. A criminal, that
is, came from somewhere, a place that a detailed life-history could
discern. ("The introduction of the 'biographical' is important to the
history of penality," Foucault noted, "because it established the
'criminal' as existing before the crime and even outside of it."' )
While this new vision of causality took the individual as its object,
then, it also dispersed the origins of criminal behavior across the
social field; the individuation of a criminal act through life-history
simultaneously represented a kind of death of the individual subject.
"Behind the offender to whom the investigation of the facts may
attribute responsibility for an offense," wrote Foucault,
stands the delinquent whose slow formation is shown in a
biographical investigation .... [O]ne sees penal discourse and
psychiatric discourse crossing each other's frontiers; and there, at
their point of junction, is formed the "dangerous" individual,
which makes it possible to draw up a network of causality in
terms of the entire biography and present a verdict of punish-
ment-correction. 26
In the Warren Report, Oswald is Foucault's ultimate "dangerous
individual." He is the perfect poster boy for a disciplinary society: the
youthful deviant who, diagnosed but untreated, went on to strike a
lethal blow at the core of national security. This image of Oswald was
all the more potent because the Commission's biographical truth was
to be the final legal word on his life, undisturbed by the discourse of
moral and legal blame that a criminal trial in Texas would have
produced had Oswald lived.
III. KNOWING OSWALD: FROM TRUANT TO ASSASSIN
The figure of Lee Harvey Oswald appears throughout the pages of
the Warren Report. It is chapter seven of the Commission's work,
however, titled "Lee Harvey Oswald: Background and Possible
Motives," that provides the most penetrating analysis of Oswald's life
and its portents of assassination.27 The chapter, in fact, functions as
the real, conceptual conclusion of the Report as a whole, though it
appears structurally as the penultimate section. By the time chapter
seven was written, the Commission's examination of the physical
evidence already had pointed to Oswald as the man who shot the rifle
25. Id. at 252.
26. Id.
27. A fuller version of Oswald's life-history was published as Appendix XIII of the Report.
See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 669-740.
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that killed the President. And the Commission's analysis of Oswald's
associates had revealed no visible links to any of the governments,
movements, or individuals that might have had a motive to assassinate
Kennedy. Oswald seemed to have acted alone. If the crime at Dealey
Plaza were to have a truth, a meaning under such circumstances, it
would have to be found in Oswald's life, in the line that led Oswald
from youthful truant to adult assassin. It was the task of chapter seven
of the Report to draw that line.
Oswald's life-history was assembled initially by three Commission
staff members, John Hart Ely, Lloyd Weinreb, and Richard Mosk,
and woven into chapter seven by Commission assistant counsel Albert
E. Jenner, Jr. and Wesley J. Liebeler. While this is not the place to
consider the contributions of specific Warren Commission staff
members, it is notable that Ely, Weinreb, and Liebeler all went on to
distinguished careers in legal teaching. Ely, who clerked for Chief
Justice Warren, taught at Harvard and Yale, served as dean of
Stanford Law School, and is currently teaching at the University of
Miami; Weinreb has been a professor of law at Harvard for many
years; and Liebeler was a professor of law at the University of
California, Los Angeles, where he is now professor emeritus.' The
careers of Ely, Weinreb, and Liebeler are significant, in part, because
they help account for the exceptionally high quality of chapter seven,
and, more importantly, they explain the fact that the Report in many
ways is a piece of scholarship. Commission critic Edward Epstein
claimed that within the Commission, chapter seven was considered the
finest piece of investigatory and narrative work of the Report.29 For
those who have read the chapter and admired its incisive analysis and
comprehensive scope, such a judgment is hardly surprising.
By the time of his death at the age of twenty-four, Oswald had
made it into the files of dozens of organizations that track potentially
troublesome people, from the CIA to the KGB, and from the marine
Corps to Guy Banister's celebrated detective agency.3" A figure who
was "a rather ordinary one in many respects, and who appeared or-
28. Norman Redlich, then professor of law and later dean of the New York University
School of Law, and Alfred Goldberg, a historian with the United States Air Force, had overall
responsibility for drafting the report and thus may have had a hand in editing chapter seven.
29. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 131. Nor is it a surprise that the chapter provided the key
source material for many of the later books on Oswald, including Don DeLillo's Libra and
Norman Mailer's Oswald's Tale. See DELILLO, supra note 8; MAILER, supra note 13. While
Mailer added significant new research on Oswald's life in the Soviet Union, both he and DeLillo
drew almost exclusively on the Warren Commission's presentation of Oswald's biography in
chapter seven of the Warren Report.
30. On Banister's agency and its Oswald files that were purchased and later destroyed by
the Louisiana State Police, see ROBERT G. BLAKEY & RICHARD N. BILLINGS, THE PLOT TO
KILL THE PRESIDENT 167 (1981). Banister also played a central role in Jim Garrison's version
of the assassination. See GARRISON, supra note 3, at 36-38.
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TABLE 1. LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S DISCIPLINARY CAREER
INSTITUTION TIME
Bethlehem Children's Home 13 months at age 3-4
New Orleans (1942-1943)
New York Youth House for Boys 1 month at age 13
New York City (1953)
Civil Air Patrol (light drilling unit) 3-9 months at age 15
New Orleans (1955)
United States Marine Corps 2.5 years at age 17-19
California and Japan (1957-1959)
(service included two courts martial and
incarceration in marine brig for 28 days)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 2 years at age 20-22
(1960_1962)31
(time included three days in Botkinskaya
Hospital Mental Unit in Moscow)
dinary," Oswald was a thoroughly documented individual.32 This
documentation emerged in large part from what might be called
Oswald's "disciplinary career" (see Table 1). We can never know how
much influence each "site" in this career had on Oswald's life, but
collectively, they provided a rich enough array of observations for the
talented young lawyers of the Warren Commission to sketch a
complex portrait of the alleged killer of the President.
To some conspiracy theorists, of course, Oswald's disciplinary
career is potent evidence that he was no lone gunman. Oswald was
useful to a conspiracy to kill the President, according to this logic,
precisely because he was already coded with so many cultural
associations that he would satisfy the need for a patsy.33 In my view,
however, the density of the sources behind the Warren Commission's
knowledge about Oswald indicates the capacity of disciplinary society
to establish knowledge of the self as a routine matter, and it suggests
31. In one of his manuscripts, Oswald described the USSR as "the collective" and
emphasized its disciplinary burdens. See WARREN CoMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 395-
96.
32. WARREN COMMISSION, WrTNEsSES, supra note 1, at 266 (testimony of Ruth Paine).
33. See, e.g., DELILLO, supra note 8, at 75.
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the usefulness of considering the Commission's life-history of Oswald
within a Foucauldian frame of analysis.
Of the entire body of biographical materials on Oswald considered
by the Commission, none was more influential in establishing the
basic picture of a psychologically motivated assassin than the records
created through an encounter Oswald had with the juvenile justice
system of New York City in 1953 at age thirteen, an encounter
stemming from Oswald's chronic absence from school.' On the basis
of his repeated truancy, Judge Leonard Sicher declared Oswald to be
beyond the control of his mother and he was remanded for several
weeks of examination to the New York City Youth House, a
diagnostic and treatment center for juvenile delinquents. Once there,
Oswald was observed and interviewed by a range of professionals,
including a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a social worker, and a
probation officer. He was subjected to a variety of tests designed to
reveal emotional and cognitive aberration, and was also subjected to
extensive one-on-one interviews. These interviews were assembled
into a dossier submitted to the New York Family Court, documenting
and explaining the young Oswald's social and psychological condition.
The report recommended that the court release Oswald on probation,
though it also suggested that the court consider incarcerating him for
psychological treatment if his truancy continued.35
The Warren Commission was not the first organization to use the
psychological reports of the Youth House to explain the Kennedy
assassination. In December 1963, for instance, the New York Times
published an extensive story on Oswald, Lee Harvey Oswald-The
Man & the Mystery, based on the Youth House dossier and interviews
with Oswald's probation officer, John Carro, and his psychiatrist, Dr.
Renatus Hartogs.3 6 According to the story, the psychiatric profile of
the thirteen-year-old Oswald had indicated that he had "schizophrenic
tendencies" and predicted that he was "potentially dangerous., 37
"This examination... ." explained reporter Donald Jackson, "found
Oswald to be full of anger although outwardly calm. It found he had
fantasies involving violence. The fatherless boy had a hatred of
authority, fixated on a father symbol. His personality was unfulfilled,
34. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 379-83.
35. Oswald's own assassin, Jack Ruby, who also has long perplexed readers of the Warren
Report, had a similar history of involvement with the juvenile justice system: Ruby was a client
of Chicago's juvenile courts in the 1920s. As with Oswald, Ruby's court files were critical in
assembling a picture of him as an individual suffering from personality defects large enough to
explain his astonishing actions in Dallas. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at
781.
36. See Donald Jackson, Lee Harvey Oswald-The Man & the Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
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reclusive, aggressive."38 An even longer version of Jackson's
reporting was published in Life under the title The Evolution of an
Assassin.39 The article, which was accompanied by the first
publication of photos of Oswald as a toddler, child, and youth,
emphasized that clear signs of Oswald's capacity for assassination
were visible in his young personality. Probation officer John Carro,
who had since become an assistant to New York Mayor Robert
Wagner, was presented as having urged that Oswald be
institutionalized. "In my report," Carro explained, "I indicated this
was a potentially dangerous situation-dangerous to his per-
sonality."' The story also noted that the report of Dr. Hartogs was
then before the Warren Commission and strongly implied that if the
doctor's diagnosis had been acted upon, it would have altered history.
(The Oswalds left New York before his recommendations could be
implemented.) "Dr. Hartogs's report was sent to Children's Court
with the recommendation that the child be committed to an institution
for his own protection and that of the community at large," wrote
Jackson.
He felt that treatment might have led to improvement, that
ultimately the boy would be rehabilitated.... The psychiatrist
said he was not surprised when Lee Oswald was arrested for the
assassination of President Kennedy. "Psychologically," he said,
"he had all the qualifications of being a potential assassin." 41
While such stories included materials on Oswald's life before and
after his Youth House encounter (accounts of his fellow marines, for
instance, described him as a shy and awkward young man), only the
Youth House dossier suggested that minor deviations were the seeds
of future disaster.
While the Warren Report itself soberly de-emphasized the
predictive value of the Youth House dossier-the Commission
asserted that "[t]he psychiatric examination did not indicate that Lee
Oswald was a potential assassin.., or that he should be
institutionalized"-it similarly presented its normalizing experts as
documenting a clear trend in Oswald toward serious psychological and
behavioral problems.42 The Commission gave its greatest attention
to Dr. Hartogs, the Youth House psychiatrist. In his testimony before
the Commission, Hartogs summarized his own earlier report on
Oswald this way:
38. Id
39. Donald Jackson, The Evolution of an Assassin, LIFE, Feb. 21, 1964, at 68A.
40. Id. at 71.
41. Id. at 72.
42. WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 379.
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This 13 year old well built boy has superior mental resources and
functions only slightly below his capacity level in spite of chronic
truancy from school which brought him into Youth House. No
finding of neurological impairment or psychotic mental changes
could be made. Lee has to be diagnosed as "personality pattern
disturbance with schizoid features and passive-aggressive tenden-
cies."'43
Such testimony, laden with the jargon and turns of phrase of the nor-
malizing expert, presented three themes that the Warren Report
traced throughout Oswald's life: his alienation, his volatile fantasy
world-and, most importantly, the inadequacies of his parenting, a
subject to which I will return shortly.
Lee is the product of a broken home-as his father died before
he was born. Two older brothers are presently in the United
States Army-while the mother supports herself and Lee as an
insurance broker. This occupation makes it impossible for her to
provide adequate supervision of Lee and to make him attend
school regularly. Lee is intensely dissatisfied with his present way
of living, but feels that the only way in which he can avoid
feeling unhappy is to deny to himself competition with other
children or expressing his needs and wants. ... Lee has [a] vivid
fantasy life, turning around the topics of omnipotence and power,
through which he tries to compensate for his present
shortcomings and frustrations. He did not enjoy being together
with other children and when we asked him whether he prefers
the company of boys to that of girls-he answered-"I dislike
everybody."'
The Report quoted a second source from the Youth House dossier:
the evaluation of Oswald made by Dr. Irvin Sokolow, a psychologist
who conducted projective figure drawing tests on the truant. Using a
conceptual language different from but related to that used by
Hartogs, Sokolow also painted Oswald as an alienated and vaguely
dangerous character:
The Human Figure Drawings are empty, poor characterizations
of persons approximately the same age as the subject. They
reflect a considerable amount of impoverishment in the social
and emotional areas. He appears to be a somewhat insecure
youngster exhibiting much inclination for warm and satisfying
relationships to others. There is some indication that he may
43. Id at 380.
44. Id at 301; see also 8 Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy,
1964: Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy 223
(1964) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Dr. Renatus Hartogs).
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relate to men more easily than to women in view of the more
mature conceptualization. He appears slightly withdrawn and in
view of the lack of detail within the drawings this may assume a
more significant characteristic. He exhibits some difficulty in
relationship to the maternal figure suggesting more anxiety in this
area than in any other.45
The Warren Commission was placed in the significant position of
both drawing on this deposit of disciplinary knowledge for its own
conclusions and implicitly passing judgment on the adequacy of New
York's penocorrectional response to Oswald. In this regard, the
Report specifically rejected the view that the New York authorities
failed. "It would be incorrect, however, to believe that those aspects
of Lee's personality which were observed in New York could have led
anyone to predict the outburst of violence which finally occurred."'
Instead, quoting Evelyn Siegel, the social worker assigned to young
Oswald, the Report stressed both the potential dangers and the
possibility of rehabilitation that characterized Lee at thirteen.
"Despite his withdrawal," noted Siegel,
[Oswald] gives the impression that he is not so difficult to reach
as he appears and patient, prolonged effort in a sustained
relationship with one therapist might bring results. There are
indications that he has suffered serious personality damage but
if he can receive help quickly this might be repaired to some
extent.47
The Report's ultimate evaluation of the Youth House dossier in this
way legitimized its disciplinary sources of knowledge, asserting that
while the system ultimately failed at criminal prevention, it had
succeeded remarkably in identifying the potential danger in young
Oswald and taking steps that should have led to its avoidance.
Beginning with the Youth House dossier, the Commission probed
further into Oswald's life, following him through one disciplinary
institution after another. After his trouble with juvenile court, for
instance, Oswald enlisted at age seventeen in the United States
Marine Corps. For the Commission, understandably, Oswald's marine
service did not provide so strong a picture of his internal pathologies
as did his Youth House experience. The military, after all, is a
disciplinary institution shaped by the first, pre-Progressive stage of
disciplinary power and emphasizes the importance of correcting
manifest behavior rather than adjusting mental and emotional states.
45. WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 381.
46. Id. at 382.
47. WARREN COMMISSION, WITNESSES, supra note 1, at exhibits 25.
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Still, the marines assiduously recorded Oswald's series of transgres-
sions and misbehaviors (which included two court martial proceedings:
one for possession of an unauthorized weapon and another for spilling
a drink on an officer in an effort to provoke a fight), as well as his
superiors' evaluations of his performance and prospects.' And here,
as in the Youth House dossier, the Commission found behavior
signals that could have been seen as portents of looming disaster.
Most importantly, Oswald's marine career revealed a young man
marked primarily by a struggle against rules and disciplines. "While
there is nothing in Oswald's military record to indicate he was
mentally unstable or otherwise psychologically unfit for duty in the
Marine Corps," explained the Commission,
he did not adjust well to conditions which he found in that
service. He did not rise above the rank of private first class, even
though he had passed a qualifying examination for the rank of
corporal. His Marine career was not helped by his attitude that
he was a man of great ability and intelligence and that many of
his superiors in the Marine Corps were not sufficiently competent
to give him orders.49
This judgment of Oswald's incapacity for normalized behavior was
reinforced by the Commission's evaluation of Oswald's educational
and professional career. The Commission tracked Oswald through
every school and every job he had ever held, and the picture
produced by this history was that of the classic ne'er-do-well who was
incapable of holding even menial jobs (sometimes leaving them
suddenly, sometimes being fired), and who was too uneducated and
emotionally unstable to sustain the more intellectually challenging
employment he craved and occasionally received.
From Oswald's career as a marine and his work history, the Warren
Commission probed still further. The staff devoted particular attention
to Oswald's family life, searching for every indication of his having
been harmed by his childhood circumstances-and especially, as I
explain below, by his mother. How did Oswald react to being placed
in the orphan's home? To his mother's divorce from her third
husband? To her frequent moves? To sleeping in the same bed with
her until he was eleven? ° Just where did the origin of the assas-
sination lie? What archive of written or remembered knowledge held
the truth of Kennedy's death? The Commission similarly examined
Oswald's marriage to Marina Nikolayevna Prusakova, whom Oswald
48. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 386.
49. Id. at 689.
50. See WARREN COMMISSION, WITNESSES, supra note 1, at 371.
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met at a dance during his two-year defection to the Soviet Union, that
disciplinary society par excellence." The young couple's life upon
returning to the United States was difficult. In a few short years, they
moved from Fort Worth to Dallas to New Orleans and back again to
Dallas, as Oswald sought work and pursued whatever strange destiny
he was recognizing. Prusakova and Oswald separated frequently, and
the testimony gathered by the Commission documents that Oswald
was an abusive husband and batterer? 2 Oswald loathed any sign of
independence in his wife-he refused to teach her English and
resented when her friends in the Russian exile community did
so-and he hit her frequently for such acts of disobedience as
smoking or drinking, both of which he forbade, and for failing to act
sufficiently deferential toward him in front of others.53 (Some
witnesses, including Marguerite Oswald, defended Lee's battering as
an appropriate response to his wife's constant nagging, spending
habits, and public displays of contempt.' 4) Significantly, the Commis-
sion ultimately did not infer the same importance from testimony
concerning Oswald's marital discord as it did from evidence about his
days in the marines or, more centrally, the Youth House. Such
behavior indicated that Oswald was a volatile and potentially violent
man, but it did not mark him as a pathological type. In 1963, violence
against one's wife, unlike truancy, was not a portent of future criminal
behavior. Moreover, the evidence of Oswald's battering was provided
mainly by his wife and women close to her, sources whose gender and
lack of psychological expertise may have lent them little epis-
temological authority before the Commission.55
Chapter seven of the Warren Report ends without attempting to
integrate all the information about Oswald drawn from his institution-
al history.5 6 While the Report draws a straight line of individual
51. On the disciplinary features of workers' lives in the Soviet Union, see STEPHEN KOTKIN,
MAGNETIC MOUNTAIN: STALINISM AS A CIVILIZATION 102-25, 196-97 (1995).
52. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 710.
53. See id. at 720.
54. See 1 Hearings, supra note 44, at 139 (testimony of Marguerite Oswald). Such assertions
were particularly ironic because, as I discuss below, Marguerite Oswald herself was accused of
the same nagging behavior and also was subjected to her son's physical violence.
55. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 720.
56. "Many factors were undoubtedly involved in Oswald's motivation for the assassination,"
concludes the Report.
[T]he Commission does not believe that it can ascribe to him any one motive or group of
motives. It is apparent, however, that Oswald was moved by an overriding hostility to his
environment. He does not appear to have been able to establish meaningful relationships
with other people. He was perpetually discontented with the world around him.... He also
had demonstrated a capacity to act decisively and without regard to the consequences when
such action would further his aims of the moment. Out of these and many other factors
which may have molded the character of Lee Harvey Oswald there emerged a man capable
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pathological development leading from Oswald's birth to November
22, 1963, it ultimately leaves Oswald the man something of a mystery.
For the narrative purpose of the Report as a whole, it was not
necessary to solve the puzzle of Oswald himself fully. It was only
necessary to show that there was a puzzle, and that its solution, which
held the truth of the assassination, lay deep within the interstices of
his life-history. In early 1964, with rumors of Soviet, Cuban, or CIA
roles in the assassination, it was enough for the Report merely to
proclaim the absence of any political threat against national security,
merely to proclaim that Oswald had acted alone. Still, for the close
reader, there was a darker implication to the Report's interpretation
of the events at Dealey Plaza. For if Oswald were just another aging
juvenile delinquent, a rebel without a cause, a person quite normal in
many respects but who also acted out his fantasies on a grand scale,
then he also could be seen as a harbinger of a potential violence
brewing throughout the United States. And if this were the case, the
need to know the origins of his mental pathology became imperative
not just for the purpose of explaining Kennedy's assassination:
Oswald's personality took on implications far larger than those
concerning an individual act of political murder. This implication
received explicit treatment in several mass-market books produced in
the aftermath of the Report, including The Two Assassins, coauthored
by none other than Dr. Hartogs, Oswald's psychiatric examiner from
his days in Youth House. 7 Hartogs had no doubt as to the conclu-
sions that must be drawn from the Warren Report's findings about
Oswald. "It is too simple to dismiss the assassination of the President,
or the death of his assassin at the hands of another man, as some
hideous accident of fate or chance," he wrote.58 "It is false thinking
as well. If we are to understand why men act as they do, we cannot
accept assassination and murder as merely matters of happen-
stance."59 In this respect, Hartogs suggested undertaking an even
more thorough individualizing inquiry than the Commission already
had conducted. "To understand the making of an assassin," he wrote,
"we need to know something about the world into which he was
hurled at birth."'
According to Hartogs, and implicitly according to the Warren
Report-indeed, according to the variety of popular interpretations
of Oswald's life published in the wake of the Commission's work-the
of assassinating President Kennedy.
Id. at 423-24.
57. RENTUS HARTOGS & LucY FREEMAN, THE Two ASSASSINS (1965).
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world into which Oswald was hurled and the social field in which he
operated were constituted above all by his mother, Marguerite.
It is curious, in this respect, that Oswald did not, in fact, become
more of an enduring exemplar of the importance of the normalizing
institutions and professions. The press did initially treat the Youth
House psychiatrist, Dr. Hartogs, as having successfully predicted
Oswald's potential for violence. As I noted, a year after the Warren
Report was published, Hartogs published his own work on the subject,
consisting largely of the Oswald and Ruby life-history portions of the
Report along with his professional psychiatric commentary. But
Oswald as deviant did not remain among the preferred readings of
what happened in Dallas. That reading ultimately faded into the
background of cultural life. How can one explain this disappearance?
Perhaps by 1963, anticommunism had usurped and exhausted the
space once occupied by the problems of deviant individuals and
communities. The mobilization of social paranoia about what future
evils were breeding in disorganized ghettos, defective families, and
exploitive industrial relations had been subsumed in the theme of
total confrontation with the Soviet Union and its allies. By the later
1960s, when the communist scare had run its course domestically
(witness the lack of interest in the wholly plausible narrative of
Oswald as victim of communist propaganda 61), disciplinary
institutions were under broad social attack and so could no longer
sustain a telling of Oswald's tale based on the epistemological vision
that justified their original expansion.
Having examined some of the institutional ghosts that haunt the
Warren Report's vision of criminological truth, I now turn to a ghost
that itself haunted those institutions: the virulent conceptions of
motherhood, so prominent in American culture at midcentury, that
implicitly shaped the Commission's depiction of Marguerite as the
ultimate source of Oswald's pathology and the nation's loss.
IV. A MOTHER IN HISTORY
In an implicit but fundamental way, the Warren Report expresses
a kind of ironic sympathy toward Lee Harvey Oswald. After all, Ely,
Weinreb, and Mosk had traced Oswald's crime to a location in which
his own individual responsibility was reduced, and had suggested that
the meaning of the Kennedy assassination lay in the complexities of
Oswald's life-history. One thinks again of the words of Foucault:
61. One book that read the Kennedy assassination as a story of communist subversion was
written by Carlos Brineguier, an anti-Castro Cuban activist in New Orleans who debated Oswald
on a local television show just months before the President's death. See CARLOS BRINEGUIER,
RED FRIDAY: Nov. 22ND, 1963 (1969).
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Behind the offender to whom the investigation of the facts may
attribute responsibility for an offense stands the delinquent
whose slow formation is shown in a biographical inves-
tigation .... [O]ne sees penal discourse and psychiatric discourse
crossing each other's frontiers; and there, at their point of
junction, is formed the "dangerous" individual, which makes it
possible to draw up a network of causality in terms of the entire
biography.62
Behind Oswald the assassin stood the delinquent slowly forming, and
it is difficult to look at Oswald's chronicle of missed possibilities and
unfulfilled dreams without feeling a certain amount of pity. Moreover,
as those who recall November of 1963 can attest, Oswald's death had
come so soon after the assassination of the President that for many,
the two deaths could be said to run together. Oswald was both killer
and victim, caught in a terrible, tragic event. He was an individual
who died without being given the chance to counter the charges
leveled against him, an untried and unconvicted man, killed in the
hands of the police to whom he had surrendered his capacity for self-
defense. It is little wonder that the Commission was prepared to feel
sorry for Oswald so long as it could trace the meaning of the
assassination to him alone. A sense of honor among men required no
less. Finally, and most importantly, there was a dark and unattractive
figure lurking behind Lee Harvey Oswald to whom no honor among
men was due: Marguerite Oswald. If the truth of Kennedy's murder
lay in the personality of Lee Oswald, then in the Commission's view,
Marguerite literally was the progenitor of the crime. The alienated
figure hostile to authority described by chapter seven, the assassin in
whose life-history lay the truth of a republican regicide, began as a
child formed above all by his experiences with his mother.
Throughout the Report, through continual suggestion, the Warren
Commission comes close to defining Marguerite as the true assassin
of the President.
In order to understand the Commission's depiction of Marguerite
Oswald, it is important to recognize the deep ambivalence concerning
the role of motherhood prevalent in mainstream American culture at
midcentury. On the surface, of course, our society has celebrated
motherhood as an institution. One need only think of popular visions
of American life after World War II, such as Father Knows Best, The
Donna Reed Show, or Leave it to Beaver. The 1950s and early 1960s
were pervaded by an ideology of domesticity, and the figure of the
mother in her suburban kitchen was an image of all that was good in
62. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 24.
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the age of Eisenhower and Kennedy. On a more fundamental level,
however, as a rich tradition of feminist scholarship has shown,
conceptions of motherhood at midcentury were also deeply encoded
with the signs of patriarchal gender domination, fitered through the
intersection of race and class. As Martha Fineman has noted,
"Motherhood has always been, and continues to be, a colonized
concept-an event physically practiced and experienced by women,
but occupied and defined, given content and value, by the core
concepts of patriarchal ideology. '
Most centrally for my purposes, as Michael Rogin has argued,
motherhood during the Cold War became the site for a whole host of
anxieties concerning the emasculating effects of an organizational
society and the complex double role of the bureaucratic state as both
communist menace and American democratic savior.' In particular,
as Rogin notes, one of the key themes animating Cold War images of
motherhood was the danger of mothers attempting to displace
paternal power. Emotional perversity and, ultimately, serious threats
to national security could result when a father was unable to interfere
with the oedipal longings between mother and child because of his
wife's overreaching her prescribed familial role.65 In this vision of
motherhood, young American sons were said to become susceptible
to communist agents after being rendered psychologically vulnerable
by their mothers' unnatural desire for closeness.' The mother was
no longer the benevolent mom in her suburban kitchen, but was
instead a monster who posed a subversive danger to the sovereign
state-a danger to be solved, as Rogin further notes, through the
vigorous assertion of masculine familial authority and the construction
of an extensive national security apparatus.
One finds this image of the mother as political threat throughout
American culture before and during the Cold War. Philip Wylie's
notorious Generation of Vipers,67 first published in 1942 but popular
throughout the 1950s, is a classic example. 8 Well known as a
magazine and fiction writer, Wylie depicted American women as
63. Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DuKE L.J. 274,290;
see also Marlee Kline, Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First
Nation Women, 18 QUEENS L.J. 306 (1993) (discussing the ideology of motherhood under
patriarchy); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1993) (same).
64. See Michael P. Rogin, Kiss Me Deadly: Communism, Motherhood, and Cold War Movies,
in RONALD REAGAN, THE MOVIE: AND OTHER EPISODES IN POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY 236,
255 (Michael Rogin ed., 1987).
65. See Rogin, supra note 64, at 245.
66. See id.
67. PHI-u, WYLIE, GENERATION OF VIPERS (1942).
68. See Rogin, supra note 64, at 242.
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leisure class members whose psychologically manipulative ways
scarred future generations and created a venal, helpless population
that might well succumb to the "Japs," Nazis, or Russians. In Wylie's
view, "momism" ultimately was responsible for "a new all-time low
in political scurviness, hoodlumism, gangsterism, labor strife,
monopolistic thuggery, moral degeneration, civic corruption, smug-
gling, bribery, theft, murder, homosexuality, drunkenness, financial
depression, chaos and war."69 On a more subtle note, the political
threat associated with motherhood frequently was explored in the
popular cinema, particularly in the series of anticommunist thrillers
produced during and just after congressional investigations into
communist influences in Hollywood. In the 1952 film My Son John,
for example, Helen Hayes plays a well-intentioned but emotionally
unbalanced woman whose overly possessive relationship with her
youngest son interferes with his masculine socialization and leaves him
vulnerable to communist propaganda.7" The Manchurian Candidate
treated this same theme even more explicitly in an ominous presaging
of the Warren Report's depiction of motherhood, which appeared
only ten years later.71 Starring Frank Sinatra and Laurence Harvey,
the thriller involves an American military patrol in Korea that is
captured and taken to a communist base in Manchuria. There, its
members are "brainwashed" to remember a false series of events in
which one patrolman, Laurence Harvey, purportedly saved the group
from a North Korean ambush; in the meantime, Harvey himself is
programmed to act as a compliant assassin with a mission to kill the
President. Angela Lansbury plays Harvey's overbearing mother in the
film, a mother/monster who constantly strives to manipulate the lives
of both her son and his stepfather, a McCarthyite senator and weak-
willed alcoholic. In a prolonged and cinematically highlighted
moment, Lansbury kisses her son deeply on the lips, and in the film's
stunning conclusion, she is revealed to be the communist agent in
charge of deploying her programmed son on his assassination attempt.
Marguerite Oswald was an ideal magnet for such cultural as-
sociations. A working-class woman from the south with only a ninth-
grade education-and, most importantly, a single mother, twice
divorced, who worked full time for most of her adult life-she
embodied a multifaceted marginality that surfaced quickly under the
intense media glare following the assassination. In the months after
Kennedy's death, this unconventional person, leading a terribly
difficult life, became a primary target for public ridicule and anger.
69. Id. at 201.
70. MY SON JOHN (Paramount Pictures 1952).
71. THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE (United Artists 1962).
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Not only did the news media relentlessly identify everything "abnor-
mal" about her life as possible sources of her son's pathology, but she
also became a central figure in several popular books about the assas-
sination. Most notable among these efforts was A Mother in History
by Jean Stafford, a long, edited interview with Marguerite
interspersed with the author's cutting remarks. 72 Originally published
as an article in the New Yorker, Stafford's book ironically took its title
from Marguerite's own moving explanation of her role as a parent:
Now I'm patting myself on the back as a mother only so that the
people will understand. Why am I so concerned that the people
will understand? It is natural because I am a mother in history.
I am in twenty-six volumes of the Warren Report, which is all
over the world, so I must defend myself and defend my son
Lee.73
A representative of the cultural and literary elite, and a personal
acquaintance of the deceased President, Stafford found in Mar-
guerite's unrefined language and personal manner endless oppor-
tunities for displaying her monstrosity. Then-Representative Gerald
Ford, who served as a member of the Warren Commission, made a
point similar to Stafford's in an article for Life. "There was the
mother, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald," wrote Ford of Kennedy's death, "a
singularly angry woman whose strange attitudes and actions provided
an appropriate background for the strange son she had shaped., 74
Such coverage was compounded by Marguerite's own predictable lack
of sophistication in public relations. Her comments were frequently
scattered and repetitive. Her testimony and interviews mixed
harangue with uncomfortable appeals for personal empathy. She often
complained that other figures, such as her son's wife Marina, were
getting more attention and publicity than she was.
While avoiding any express condemnation of Marguerite, chapter
seven of the Report provides an implicit indictment of her failures as
a mother, depicting her in a manner that closely conforms to the Cold
War cinematic images of motherhood discussed by Rogin and others.
The Report strongly implies that Marguerite sought too much
closeness with her son. John Pic, Marguerite's oldest son and Lee's
half brother, was quoted in the Report as recalling that "Lee slept
with my mother until I joined the service in 1950. This would make
him approximately 10, well, almost 11 years old."'75 This sense of
unnatural sexual interest between mother and son was already part of
72. JEAN STAFFORD, A MOTHER IN HISTORY (1965).
73. Id. at 25.
74. HARTOGS & FREEMAN, supra note 57, at 39.
75. WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 382.
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the picture drawn by the New York clinicians. Social worker Evelyn
Siegel's report of her interview with Marguerite, published as part of
the Commission's exhibits, noted Marguerite's interest in certain
abnormalities on Lee Oswald's penis." The Report linked this
unnatural interest to Marguerite's supposed efforts to prevent a father
figure from coming between them, a mission evidenced for the
Commission by her departure from New York just as the juvenile
justice system was prepared to subject Oswald to treatment. Here,
again, the Commission relied on the work of Dr. Hartogs, who had
prescribed a course of therapy and counseling for both Lee and his
mother. The Report summarized Hartogs's findings by paying
particular attention to issues of gender identification. "Dr. Hartogs
recommended that Oswald be placed on probation on condition that
he seek help and guidance through a child guidance clinic," the
Report noted.77 "There, he suggested, Lee should be treated by a
male psychiatrist who could substitute for the lack of a father figure.
He also recommended that Mrs. Oswald seek psychotherapeutic
guidance through contact with a family agency."78 The Report also
quoted extensively from the Youth House dossier in highlighting the
conclusion that Marguerite lay behind the thirteen-year-old Oswald's
problems:
The reports of the New York authorities indicate that Lee's
mother gave him very little affection and did not serve as any
sort of substitute for a father. Furthermore she did appear to
understand her own relationship to Lee's psychological problems.
After the interview with Mrs. Oswald, Mrs. Siegel described her
as a "smartly dressed, gray haired woman, very self-possessed
and alert and superficially affable," but essentially a "defensive,
rigid, self-involved person who had real difficulty in accepting
and relating to people" and who had "little understanding" of
Lee's behavior and of the "protective shell he has drawn around
himself." Dr. Hartogs reported that Mrs. Oswald did not
understand that Lee's withdrawal was a form of violent but silent
protest against his neglect by her and represents his reaction to
a complete absence of any real family life.79
The Commission's depiction of Marguerite's failings as a mother was
amplified by the account of her willful subversion of the state's efforts
to succeed where she had failed as a parent. This characterization of
the single mother as a problem that needs to be solved through the
76. See WARREN COMMISSION, wrNEssEs, supra note 1, at exhibits 22.
77. WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 380.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 380-81.
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imposition of a paternal authority figure is one that has come to have
an enduring role in public discourse, exercising a pervasive influence,
for instance, on discussions of welfare policy.8° A few years later the
single mother would emerge as a challenge to national security in the
Moynihan Report." In the context of the Warren Report, however,
the Oswald single-parent household was not so much a problem to be
solved as a cultural narrative waiting to anchor an account of the
Kennedy assassination in social and psychological terms.'
Following on the evidence provided by the Youth House, the
Commission consistently sought to elicit criticism of Marguerite from
its witnesses, including her surviving sons, John Pic and Robert, and
her sister, Lillian Murrets. Assistant Counsel Albert Jenner's
questions to Lee's brother Robert marked out a pathological line of
cross-examination that runs throughout the volumes of testimony and
exhibits that accompanied the Warren Report: "I take it, Mr. Oswald,
your mother put Lee in the orphan home at the first opportunity open
to her under the rules or policy of the Bethlehem Orphan Home in
that respect."' 3 "[Was Marguerite] able to give the normal and full
time and attention of a mother to her son Lee?"' "Would you relate
for us as you recall now the relationships between you and John
[Pic]-between you boys and your mother? Was that a pleasant one?
Were there any difficulties that you now recall? Personality-wise, for
example." 5
One of the central themes in the Report's representation of
Marguerite was that she was too distant a figure in Oswald's life, and
that she chose to work not because of economic necessity, but
because she desired to shake off the burdens of mothering. What is
so striking in this respect is how much evidence in Marguerite's
testimony there was to the contrary, how easily one can provide a
different interpretation of her life. Marguerite was seven months
pregnant with Lee when her second husband, Robert Oswald, died in
his sleep of a massive coronary.8 6 After his death, she used his life
insurance proceeds to purchase a small house, in front of which she
80. See Fineman, supra note 63, at 276.
81. The Moynihan Report is the popular name for OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING &
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACrlON-THE NEGRO FAMILY
30 (1965); see also LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND
THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 246-47 (1967).
82. See sources cited supra note 63. Fineman points out that one of the functions of the
image of the single mother as a problem in welfare discourse is precisely to turn discussion away
from the social and economic factors underlying the condition of poor families. See Fineman,
supra note 63, at 275.
83. 1 Hearings, supra note 44, at 272-73 (statement of Albert Jenner).
84. Id. at 279.
85. Id. at 281.
86. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 670.
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opened "Oswald's Notions," a shop that sold thread, cleaning items,
and other conveniences. This provided a way for her to earn money
while staying with her children. Only after that business failed did
Marguerite enter the general labor market, holding a series of jobs
ranging from low-level clerical work to serving as an insurance
broker.' It was only once she was required to work full time that
she arranged to have her older boys placed in a home for orphans and
the children of single mothers. The home apparently would not take
Lee because he was too young; instead, he was cared for by his aunt,
a woman with five children of her own, and later, when Marguerite's
relationship with her sister soured, by a couple Marguerite took into
her own house in exchange for rent and child care.' (Lee ultimately
spent about one year in the orphan home, from ages three to four.)
One can only imagine the great social and economic difficulties
Marguerite faced as she attempted to take care of her son once she
had retrieved him from the orphanage. Yet the Warren Report con-
demned her, in terms that sound quaint today, for frequently leaving
Lee "in an empty house" to fend for himself for meals ("his mother
having trained him to do that rather than to play with other children,"
the Commission asserted).,9 The Report cited Youth House social
worker Evelyn Siegel's diagnosis in this regard, linking Lee's
psychological problems to Marguerite's neglect:
He withdrew into a completely solitary and detached existence
where he did as he wanted and he didn't have to live by any
rules or come into contact with people. He stayed in bed until
eleven or twelve, got up .... When he was asked if he wished
that she would do something [about his truancy] he nodded and
finally emerged with the fact that he just felt like a burden she
had to tolerate, and while she took care of the material needs, he
never felt that she was involved with him in any way or cared
very much what happened to him."
Again, Marguerite's own explanatory statements concerning her life
implicitly were ignored or given little attention, submerged in the
imperative to construct an image of the mother/monster who posed
a risk to national security. When her own statements were repeated
in the Warren Report and elsewhere, they generally were placed in
a context or presented in a way that made her seem defensive and
87. See id.
88. Moreover, Marguerite terminated the child care arrangement after she learned that the
couple had taken to whipping Lee to quiet him. She fired the couple on the spot. See id. at 671.
89. Id. at 378.
90. WARREN COMMISSION, WrINESSES, supra note 1, at exhibits 19-20.
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self-pitying. In fact, however, these are words that, when read on their
own, are moving accounts of a woman's hardship:
I'm a good woman, a good, honest woman.... I had raised my
children alone and had struggled, not only financially, but was
always tired and had no life of my own. In other words, as soon
as I came home from work, my children wanted their food, so
immediately I started working again. I sort of lived for the day
when my children would find a good woman and marry and have
somebody to take care of them, because it was almost impossible
for me to work and to do justice to those boys.9
Such pleas of necessity were undermined by the unexplicated
assumption that a proper mother would have found and subordinated
herself to a male figure willing to share the burden of parenting.
Not surprisingly, from the start, Marguerite was one of the most
radical challengers to the Commission's claims, as well as one of the
most outspoken supporters of a conspiracy theory of the assassination.
While many of her theories contained racist implications or were
simply bizarre, reading her testimony and interviews thirty years later
can be a deeply affecting experience.92 Marguerite's words may be
comical, but they also are disturbing-and sometimes, extremely
insightful. 93 In particular, Marguerite's testimony reflects a deep
appreciation of how important the construction of Lee's life-history
was to the Commission's work. She understood that Lee's biography
would be the conceptual foundation for the Warren Report, and from
the start, she tried to tell her son's story in her own way, against the
Commission's efforts to cut off her narrative. "-Well, aren't you
gentlemen-... aren't you gentlemen interested in my son's life from
the very beginning?" she exclaimed.
I think you should, because it has been exploited in all the
magazines and papers. And this is not my son is what I am trying
91. Id. at exhibits 20.
92. In the latter category is her grotesque suggestion to Jean Stafford, based on the then-
emerging reports of Kennedy's hidden medical problem (Addison's disease), that her son may
have been a government agent on a mission to rescue the country from a sickly President. See
STAFFORD, supra note 72, at 15.
93. "On some Mother's Day, I think it would be wonderful for the United States to come
out and say my son was an agent. It would be wonderful if they would come out in behalf of his
family and his mother and say he died in the service of his country. They're not all-powerful,
and not everything they do is right. I love my United States, but I don't think just because I was
born in it, that we're perfect. And I feel that my son Lee Harvey Oswald felt the same way. If
he learned those truths from me, I didn't teach him, but if he sensed that was the way I felt, I
make no apology for it either." Id. at 105-06. Against the cautious and lawyerly text of the
Warren Report, such language seems shameless, loud, and hyperbolic; but perhaps we still
cannot hear Marguerite apart from the potent nexus of misogynist images of domineering
mothers, gender deviates, and political insecurities that characterized the era of the Warren
Report.
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to say. He is not a perfect boy, and I am not a perfect woman.
But I can show a different side of Lee Harvey Oswald, which I
hope to do to this Commission.94
Marguerite sought to create a biography that would undercut the life-
history of Lee's deviance constructed by the Commission. While
Warren and his staff traced a line of evidence reflecting Oswald's
pathologies, Marguerite assembled her own genealogy of his "normal"
traits. "My child was a normal child... ," she recalled.95 "I
explained to you he had a dog with puppies. The school teachers
talked well about him. He had a bicycle. There was nothing abnormal
about Lee Oswald.,9 6 Even if unconvincing to her contemporaries,
Marguerite's narrative points with considerable precision to the
elements of the Commission's life-history. And if her proclamations
of her boy's "normality" were self-serving, they remind us that the far
more persuasive Commission account rests on the cultural judgments
of disciplinary "experts" embedded in their own institutionalized
failures. At times, Marguerite gestured toward a picture of her son in
which his act at Dealey Plaza was the precise consequence of the
disciplinary institutions that sought to normalize his behavior
throughout his life. Where the Commission portrayed her as the
source of Lee's dangerous path of deviation, she blamed the very
institutions that provided the knowledge upon which the Commission
drew. "I find these things very interesting," she told Jean Stafford,
"because as I'm researching Lee's life-and I'm not the only one-it
looks as though this boy's life has been supervised. But if I stress this,
they say, 'This woman is out of her mind. Let's put her in a mental
institution.' Isn't it silly? 97
In this respect-and with implications I will consider in greater
detail in a moment-the Commission's portrait of Marguerite shows
a woman engaged in a lifelong struggle with the effort of disciplinary
institutions to define her and her family as deviant and dangerous, a
woman whose actions consistently exhibited her unarticulated
assumption that those institutions were themselves a source of
pathology. Here, again, her son's experience with the Youth House
is revealing. The notes of social worker Evelyn Siegel document not
only Lee Harvey Oswald's psychological state, but also his mother's.
Marguerite exhibited an openly combative stance toward the entire
juvenile justice system. "Her feeling was that New York City laws
were in a large measure responsible for Lee's continued truancy,"
94. 1 Hearings, supra note 44, at 195 (statement of Marguerite Oswald).
95. Id. at 230.
96. Id.
97. STAFFORD, supra note 72, at 22.
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reported Siegel, "and that if they had left things for her to handle, she
could have managed him.... She thought the biggest mistake was the
way the Bureau of Attendance approached the boy, and [she] said
they were making a 'criminal out of him."'98 Similarly, after Lee was
released from the Youth House, when probation officer John Carro
told Marguerite that her son would be required to report to him
weekly, she emphatically objected. Recalling her conversation with
Carro to the Commission, Marguerite explained:
So I was very definite with Mr. Carro. I did not mince my words.
I said, "Mr. Carro, my son is not reporting to you once a week.
This is not a criminal offense. He was picked up for truancy, he
has assured the judge, promised the judge that he would be back
to school. He has promised you he would be back to school.
Let's give this boy a chance, let's see if he will go to school. And
then, Mr. Carro, if he doesn't go to school, then you can have
him report to you."99
Indeed, Marguerite continued to resist institutions seeking to
pathologize her and her family even in relation to the Warren
Commission itself, denying she had willfully ignored warnings of Lee's
problems and affirmatively attacking the disciplinary logic of those
normalizing experts who treated all that was out of the ordinary as
pathological and dangerous. In her interview with Stafford, for
instance, Marguerite directly attacked the Warren Commission for
imposing a penological truth on Lee's life-history. "Of course after
they arrested [Lee] they had to find an environmental factor," she
exclaimed, with safe logic, "and right away they said we moved
around a lot. Well, all right, what if we did? We weren't drifters. This
is the twentieth century, and people move around."'"
Despite such moments of lucid resistance to her negative portrayal
as a mother, Marguerite never could shake the public verdict against
her. Neither of her two surviving sons spoke to her again after Lee's
funeral, and her only consistent interlocutors for the remainder of her
life were assassination buffs, who found in her a ready ear for
virtually any conspiracy theory. As the years passed, the media came
to her for quotes on anniversaries of Kennedy's death. Yet even as
events such as Watergate and the Church Committee revelations of
CIA plots to kill Fidel Castro began to alter the background
assumptions about knowledge and power unchallengeable in 1964, she
98. 3 Hearings, supra note 44, at 493 (statement of Evelyn Siegel).
99. 1 Id. at 229 (statement of Marguerite Oswald).
100. STAFFORD, supra note 72, at 23.
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remained a ridiculed figure. She died near Fort Worth in 1981, alone
and on the edge of poverty where she had spent most of her life. 1'
V. CONCLUSION: A COUNTERHISTORY OF THE KENNEDY
ASSASSINATION
Most considerations of the Warren Report in the years since its
publication have been preoccupied with the question of whether Lee
Harvey Oswald acted alone or was involved in a conspiracy to
assassinate President Kennedy. As I noted earlier, I believe scholars
should engage in a different type of conversation, one that attempts
to reconstruct the background of institutions, knowledges, and
practices against which the Warren Commission operated and
presented its vision of truth.1°" One recent and intriguing work
engaged in this type of analysis is Peter Dale Scott's Deep Politics and
the Death of JEK.1° Scott asks readers to reconsider what they
know about November 22, 1963 from a perspective on American life
that includes what he terms "deep politics." By "deep politics," Scott
means all those "political practices and arrangements, deliberate or
not, that are usually repressed rather than acknowledged" in the
history of U.S. government.1° Among such repressed practices and
arrangements, according to Scott, are those that have been revealed
only in fragments over the last three decades, exposing the darker
sides of American power, intelligence agency crimes, Mafia
penetration into politics at all levels, and routine official lying and
misinformation. Scott's formulation is admirable. At the least, an
interpretation of the assassination formulated without reference to the
existence of these now-acknowledged features of American history is
incomplete.
This Article represents a somewhat parallel effort to restore some
previously neglected institutions to the background against which we
interpret Kennedy's assassination. The files of the New York Youth
House and the marines, and the Commission's interviews with
employers and friends, are foundational elements of the truth the
Commission was able to produce. In this sense, these files and the
institutions and practices that produced them are "ghosts" that haunt
the work of the Commission, as well as much of twentieth-century
101. See Domestic News, UPI, Mar. 4, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File;
Regional News (Texas), UPI, Jan. 17, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
102. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
103. SCOTT, supra note 3.
104. Id. at 7. The term "deep politics" is somewhat inapt, because Scott emphasizes that such
practices operate on the same level as more visible political power, but are unacknowledged. For
Scott, the assumption of a deep and determining hand beneath government is the substance of
too many misguided conspiracy theories of the Kennedy assassination. See id. at 16.
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criminal law. Disciplinary institutions and their practices of
examination, training, and confession are haunted by their own ghosts.
These techniques of knowledge and power do not operate indepen-
dently on subjects, but operate in and through embedded cultural
norms and assumptions about race, class, and-of particular relevance
to Oswald's case-gender. °5
By reconstructing the disciplinary background of the Warren
Commission, I hope not only to have engaged in an act of historical
contextualization, but also to have begun an alternative reading of the
past, an alternative reading suggested in part by Marguerite Oswald.
For in her criticisms of the institutions of legal authority that touched
her son's life, from the New York Youth House to the Warren
Commission, Marguerite pointed to a counterhistory of her son
precisely contrary to that framed by the Commission-a counterhis-
tory in which the exercise of state authority, not her own corrupting
maternal influence, put Lee Harvey Oswald on the path to Dealey
Plaza. Hers is a counterhistory in which disciplinary institutions
themselves, not Oswald's failures within them, transformed him into
a killer. Following Marguerite's lead, I begin to remap Oswald's life-
history within a narrative vision sensitive to the forms of power joined
to the mechanisms of truth on which the Warren Report depends.1°"
The natural place to begin is by reconsidering Oswald's relationship
to disciplinary institutions generally. In particular, as I have noted, the
Warren Report presented Oswald as the quintessential failure of a
disciplinary system, as a truant, a rebellious marine, and a slacker at
employment. But this official reading of Oswald as an undisciplined
malcontent is incomplete at best. Most importantly, while Oswald at
times may have been a kind of fugitive from discipline, the trajectory
of his life was also marked by a persistent pursuit of disciplinary
experience and a desire to subject himself to rigorous self-monitoring
and surveillance. The ambiguity of Oswald's attitude toward dis-
ciplinary institutions appeared, for instance, in his Youth House
interview with social worker Evelyn Siegel. "Talk about future
planning produced the fact that Lee wanted to return home and his
105. Foucault ignored the role of gender, and the role of culture generally, in the operation
of disciplinary institutions, but others have pursued their connection. See generally JUDITH P.
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); LOIs
MCNAY, FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM: POWER, GENDER AND THE SELF (1992); JANA SAWICKI,
DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT: FEMINISM, POWER AND THE BODY (1991).
106. This parallels the somewhat different effort of conspiracy theorists to develop
alternative biographies of Lee Harvey Oswald. See, e.g., EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, LEGEND: THE
SECRET WORLD OF LEE HARVEY OSWALD (1978). Interestingly, materials for such a remapping
were already available in the mid-1960s in the form of labeling theory. See generally EDWIN
LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE: SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1967); DAVID
MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr (1964).
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assurance that he would run away if he were placed in a boarding
school," Siegel wrote of her conversation with the young Oswald."°
"Being away from home means a loss of his freedom and privacy to
him, and he finds it disturbing living with other boys, having to take
showers with them and never being alone.' 'lts Continuing, though
failing to note the irony of Oswald's ideological reversal, Siegel
further reported: "If [Lee] could have his own way, he would like to
be on his own and join the Service. While he feels that living that
close to other people and following a routine would be distasteful he
would 'steel' himself to do it."'"
A conscious pursuit of discipline characterized Oswald throughout
his life. At fifteen, for instance, Oswald was so anxious to submit
himself to rigorous, masculine authority that he joined the marines
and applied for membership in the Socialist Workers Party's Young
People's Socialist League. (Frustrated by the lack of response, he
joined a militaristic drill club based at the New Orleans airport.) After
his service in the U.S. armed forces, he defected to the Soviet Union,
where his early letters and interviews suggest that he hoped to find a
more disciplined, collectively organized society than the decadent and
individualistic America he decried. Inspired by Marxism, Oswald
dreamed of a revolutionary discipline in which rigorous controls over
the self were sanctified in the name of an historic destiny. He scared
away one of his few high school friends when he revealed that he was
trying to find a communist cell in New Orleans, and he fantasized out
loud with a marine buddy about joining Fidel Castro in the moun-
tains.
The Warren Commission's depiction of Oswald as a kind of eternal
delinquent also downplayed the evidence of the prodigious capacity
for self-discipline manifested in his Spartan lifestyle and meticulous
personal hygiene. According to Oswald's own notes, for example, he
spent much of his time as a high school student reading Capital1 '
in the New Orleans public library. Later, he desperately wanted to go
to college, and he was bitterly disappointed when the Soviets refused
to send him to university."' Even Oswald's supposed failures within
disciplinary institutions can be interpreted as resulting from the
ambiguity those organization themselves contained vis-A-vis a vision
107. WARREN COMMISSION, WITNESsES, supra note 1, at 21.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. KARL MARX, CAPITAL (Frederick Engels ed. & Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling
trans., International Publishers 1967) (1954).
111. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 679; see also id. at 698. Oswald
was rejected by the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow on the grounds that it was es-
tablished to educate students from oppressed and impoverished lands.
1998]
33
Simon: Ghosts of the Disciplinary Machine
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 75
of control. The Warren Commission, for example, found it meaningful
that Oswald could not stomach the subordination to others required
by the military. But there is as much reason to attribute Oswald's
problems in the marines to the same sociability failures that plagued
him as an employee, and even to view those problems as resulting
from his desire for an even more stringently organized experience
than the military could offer. We tend to think of the military as a
social site requiring endless personal control, but it is also famous for
its sanctioned discipline breakdowns."2 While his fellow marines
teased him for his refusal to join them in haunting drinking and
prostitution sites in Japan,"' Oswald spent hours studying Russian
in the base library."4
There may be a number of ways of understanding the danger
Oswald posed to society, in fact, that are obscured precisely by the
Commission's reading of its disciplinary sources. One might consider,
for instance, the possibility that Oswald was one of the predictable by-
products of institutions, like New York's Youth House, that strive to
convert rebelliousness into the disturbing but malleable substance of
crime and delinquency. As Foucault notes:
For the observation that the prison fails to eliminate crime, one
should perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has suc-
ceeded extremely well in producing delinquency, a specific type,
a politically or economically less dangerous-and, on occasion,
usable-form of illegality; in producing delinquents, in an
apparently marginal but in fact centrally supervised milieu; in
producing the delinquent as a pathological subject."'
From this perspective, Oswald can be understood as an extreme case
of the kind of inadvertent double agent that a disciplinary society
routinely produces at a more mundane level. As Marguerite suggested
to Evelyn Siegel, Oswald might have been the victim of a society of
systematic normalization that identifies and reinforces deviance in its
"failures."' 6 Indeed, Oswald's life-history reveals a pattern in which
he initially was satisfied and engaged in each new disciplinary environ-
ment, and then quickly came to resent and rebel against the
112. Perhaps the best known recent occurrence of this sort was the "Tailhook" naval
officers' convention in September 1991. The events that took place there-including strippers
performing sex publicly, men walking about with their genitalia exposed, and officers groping
and abusing women in the infamous "gauntlet" on the third floor of the Las Vegas Hil-
ton-became a national scandal. See Charles C. Moskos, Foreward to WILLIAM H. MCMICHAEL,
THE MOTHER OF ALL HOOKS: THE STORY OF THE U.S. NAVY'S TAILHOOK SCANDAL at xi
(1997).
113. See MAILER, supra note 13, at 328.
114. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 685.
115. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 277.
116. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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institution with increasing violence. The disciplinary institutions
toward which Oswald was attracted and under the surveillance of
which he was routinely placed seem to have identified and created
within him an intensifying sense of desperation and hostility. It is
possible to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, shot and
killed President Kennedy with no motivation other than one internal
to his own life-history and yet still to perceive a political meaning to
the assassination. The Warren Report was both correct and fun-
damentally incomplete in its analysis.
One might argue still further along these lines, pushing the notion
that Oswald's actions (whether killing President Kennedy or allowing
himself to become the "patsy" in a plot to murder the President) were
determined both by dynamics internal to his personality and by the
disciplinary institutions that had made his personality a subject of his
own strategic manipulations. As his relentless pursuit of discipline
suggests, Oswald was not simply a passive subject of institutions;
instead, over time, he became an active participant in the shaping of
his own dossier, demonstrating striking sophistication at manipulating
the very disciplinary systems in which he was caught. At age sixteen,
for instance, he wrote a letter to his school under his mother's name
announcing false plans to relocate to San Diego and requesting that
his files be forwarded to his address. 7 That same year, he at-
tempted to falsify his age to join the marines (he apparently was
discovered by the recruiter)."' Once in the military, he sought and
received permission to leave three months early on the grounds that
his mother had suffered an accident and was dependent on him,
mobilizing Marguerite to acquire the necessary medical certifications.
Once Oswald received his discharge, he quickly left his mother and
went overseas to defect to the USSR."9 In Moscow, he dramatically
resisted the effort of Soviet authorities to eject him from the country
after his initial application for residence had been denied. Oswald
went to the American embassy and denounced his citizenship in what
his own notes acknowledge to have been a performance planned on
the assumption that the Soviets monitoring the embassy would
become aware of his actions." When that failed to secure him
permission to stay, Oswald slit his wrists in a calculated bid to delay
his deportation. Still later, he successfully obtained permission for
himself and his wife to emigrate back to the United States, an
extraordinary accomplishment at the time, and one conducted largely
117. See WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 354.
118. See id at 384.
119. See id. at 689.
120. See id. at 260-62.
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through his own efforts to out-manipulate the authorities of both
nations by flooding them with a stream of procedurally correct
requests, claims, and appeals.12 ' Later still, back in the United
States, Oswald took advantage of his employment at a photographic
company to produce a fake draft identification.' In New Orleans,
he invented a one-person branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Commit-
tee, writing the national organization and, without authorization,
printing his own membership cards."2 When he visited the Cuban
embassy in Mexico in a bid to win a visa to either Cuba or the USSR,
he brought a homemade dossier of his political activities on the part
of the Cuban cause." 4
Conspiracy theorists may find in these incidents reported by the
Warren Commission evidence that Oswald was preparing a cover."
But Oswald's conduct was also compatible with the kind of amateur
spy obsession that may have been an outgrowth of his fascination with
the television series I Led Three Lives-though for that, no less sig-
nificant.126 For somewhere in the course of his life, Oswald became
a person for whom the production of identity was a special and all-
consuming problem. Somewhere on his path to Dealey Plaza, Oswald
learned the cost of being without credible explanations of who he was
and what he stood for, the kind of issues that can make spy fantasies
themselves so appealing. Disciplinary institutions are a peculiar form
of intelligence service. While classic spies are individuals who produce
the secrets of one state in the service of another, disciplinary
institutions are agencies that produce the secrets of individuals in the
service of the state. We return once again to Oswald's stay in the
Youth House. We know, for one, that the experience was profoundly
disturbing to Oswald. When Marguerite first visited him there, he
wrote poignantly, "Mother, I want to get out of here. There are
children in here who have killed other people, and smoke. I want to
get out."'27 More centrally, it was in New York that Oswald was
first immersed in the practices of normalizing discipline, compulsory
confession, and penotherapeutic interrogation. "Questioning elicited
121. See id. at 706.
122. See id. at 203.
123. See id. at 290-92.
124. See id. at 731.
125. Jim Garrison, for example, viewed Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities as the
development of a Marxist identity useful for the conspirators in making Oswald the fall guy. See
GARRISON, supra note 3, at 25-28.
126. Oswald's interest in I Led Three Lives was revealed by Marguerite in her testimony
before the Commission. See 1 Hearings, supra note 44, at 200.
127. WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 363. This statement is particularly
haunting because Oswald's touching naivetd in linking smoking and homicide is absolutely on
point-describing, no doubt, real people with whom young Oswald came into contact, but also
revealing a disciplinary logic in which deviations and atrocities always are connected.
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the information that he feels almost as if there is a veil between him
and other people through which they cannot reach him, but he prefers
this veil to remain intact," wrote Evelyn Siegel."2 "He admitted,
however, the tearing aside of the veil in talking to a social worker was
not as painful as he would have anticipated."' 29 She continued:
There was some very minimal movement in his relationship with
his social worker, although it was so small as to be almost not
noticeable. Ordinarily when he approached he remained polite
but uncommunicative but when he was shown some special
attention and concern when he had an earache, he responded
somewhat. He never sought his caseworker out, and asked for
nothing, nor did he volunteer anything further about himself." °
We can never know what impressions these experiences had on the
young Oswald, but perhaps if we look closely, we might glimpse in the
boy's uncommunicative hesitancy the development of a self-reflective
capacity to present his case to whatever institutions confronted him.
In this respect, one can read his assassination of President Kennedy,
ultimately, as a manifestation of Oswald's will to truth, of Oswald's
desire to present a kind of dossier in which he offered a powerful
interpretation of the meanderings of his short life to himself, to
others, and to history. Such a reading does not make the assassination
any less aberrational, but it reminds us that disciplinary societies
generate a dangerous tension capable of disastrous results. Where
democratic political authority depends on practices of knowledge and
power that it cannot fully acknowledge, let alone regulate, the
possibility of spectacular short circuits, of unplanned contact between
the official world of sovereignty and the shadow world of disciplinary
institutions, always is latent.' Obviously, nobody in the Youth
House set out to shape a murderer, let alone an assassin; but in the
very insistence that juvenile delinquency contains the seeds of major
atrocity, disciplinary institutions anticipate, and perhaps even establish
the potentiality of, events like the Kennedy assassination.
It is with the thought of Oswald presenting himself to history that
I wish to conclude. I have spent much of this Article considering the
ways in which the Warren Commission based its vision of the truth of
the Kennedy assassination and its perpetrator on an archipelago of
128. WARREN COMMISSION, WITNESSES, supra note 1, at exhibits 20.
129. Id.
130. Id. at exhibits 21.
131. On Oswald's view of himself in history, see the testimony of Kerry Thornley, a friend
of Oswald in the marines: "He looked upon the eyes of future people as some kind of tribunal,
and he wanted to be on the winning side so that 10,000 years from now people would look in
the history books and say, 'Well, this man was ahead of his time.' . . . The eyes of the future
became. . . the eyes of God." WARREN COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 2, at 389.
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lowly disciplinary institutions, its ghosts. These are ghosts, however,
that are less and less obvious to us. At a time like the present, when
fourteen-year-olds can be tried in felony court and receive life
sentences,132 the voices of the Youth House dossier can seem almost
charming, echoes of a naive but self-confident age.
More significantly, I believe it is possible to view the Warren
Report as standing near an important transformation in the history of
penality. Perhaps nothing is more representative of this change than
the receding importance of life-history itself in understanding the
truth of crime. The knowledge/power formation built around the in-
dividualizing of delinquent subjects that the Warren Commission
reflected has been largely dismantled.133 And since the 1970s, the
direction of reform in criminal sentencing generally has been toward
uniformity and fixity and away from individualizing punishment to fit
the criminal under scrutiny. Medical and psychiatric concepts have
been largely eliminated from our penal codes, often in response to
political assassinations. Crime is more likely today to be understood
as a statistical artifact-a rate, an actuarial distribution of risk, the
predictable threat posed by dangerous classes-than as the develop-
mental twists in the lives of individual citizens. Our prisons may still
bear the cellular structure in which a kind of individualization was
born, but they increasingly function as part of aggregate strategies
that target high-risk subpopulations. The strategies' objective is not to
transform deviants but to contain and manage them.3
One of the functions of genealogy is to give us a glimpse of
alternatives to our own present. Had an even more professionalized
and well-capitalized normalizing criminal justice system emerged from
the 1960s, from the Kennedy-Johnson agenda, we might today see the
Warren Report's study of Oswald as a decisive moment in the
formation of that program. Instead, it is possible to understand the
Kennedy assassination as an important element in the cultural
transformations that helped undermine the disciplinary regime of
truth upon which the Warren Report was constructed. The Presiden-
tial elections in 1964 were the first to make crime in the streets an
issue of national importance. Kennedy's death, along with the other
assassinations of that era, the urban disorders, the war in Vietnam,
and the protest movement against it at home, all contributed to a sea
change of public opinion regarding crime and penology. Sentiment
132. For a discussion of the increasingly punitive approach to juvenile offenders, see
generally Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, in 17 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 197 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993).
133. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (offering a stinging critique of the most
developed part of the juvenile justice system).
134. See sources cited supra note 18.
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began to shift away from modernist notions of individuality and
rehabilitation and toward traditional punitiveness combined with
postmodern strategies of actuarial justice-a shift that placed the
Warren Report's psychobiographical interpretation of the Kennedy
assassination in a very different context of memory.
From this perspective, the Warren Report remains a profound
landmark in a transformation of the mechanisms of truth and power
that are our inheritance. But if the disciplinary institutions that gave
us our understanding of Lee Harvey Oswald are now part of the past,
they leave their own ghosts in the present. We feel their failures-and
our own failure to replace them with alternative institutions-in the
large numbers of young men occupying our prisons, jails, and
homeless shelters at the end of the twentieth century. Many of them
are the damaged goods of institutions grown even rustier and meaner
than they were in the 1950s. Many of them, like Oswald, are from
homes headed by single mothers in a society in which that status
remains as demonized as ever.135 Many of them, like Oswald,
discern the potential for social status in masculine discipline, though
they seek it in socially disapproved institutions, such as street gangs
and revolutionary cells. Unlike the Warren Commission, however, we
don't want to know their names, the sordid facts of their childhoods,
or the chronicle of their despairs. Yet in the fear they are capable of
generating in others, in the unremarkable but undismissible possibility
that they might explode into a sudden violence, these angry young
men leave us close to the unresolvable mysteries of Dealey Plaza. In
this sense, while the assassination of John F Kennedy recedes into an
even more distant past, the fear of unpredictable and unpreventable
tragedy weighs more heavily upon our lives and consciousness. We
remain, that is, in so many different and conflicting ways, very much
in the thrall of the violence of November 22, 1963.
135. See sources cited supra note 63.
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